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Abstract
Incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are designed to incentivize financially
self-interested workers to generate and report high-quality labels. Existing mech-
anisms are often developed as one-shot static solutions, assuming a certain level
of knowledge about worker models (expertise levels, costs of exerting efforts,
etc.). In this paper, we propose a novel inference aided reinforcement mechanism
that learns to incentivize high-quality data sequentially and requires no such prior
assumptions. Specifically, we first design a Gibbs sampling augmented Bayesian
inference algorithm to estimate workers’ labeling strategies from the collected
labels at each step. Then we propose a reinforcement incentive learning (RIL)
method, building on top of the above estimates, to uncover how workers respond
to different payments. RIL dynamically determines the payment without accessing
any ground-truth labels. We theoretically prove that RIL is able to incentivize
rational workers to provide high-quality labels. Empirical results show that our
mechanism performs consistently well under both rational and non-fully rational
(adaptive learning) worker models. Besides, the payments offered by RIL are more
robust and have lower variances compared to the existing one-shot mechanisms.
1 Introduction
The ability to quickly collect large-scale and high-quality labeled datasets is crucial for Machine
Learning (ML). Among all proposed solutions, one of the most promising options is crowdsourcing
[11, 29, 6, 28]. Nonetheless, it has been noted that crowdsourced data often suffers from quality
issue, due to its salient feature of no monitoring and no ground-truth verification of workers’ contri-
bution. This quality control challenge has been attempted by two relatively disconnected research
communities. From the more ML side, quite a few inference techniques have been developed to infer
true labels from crowdsourced and potentially noisy labels [24, 16, 41, 40]. These solutions often
work as one-shot, post-processing procedures facing a static set of workers, whose labeling accuracy
is fixed and informative. Despite their empirical success, the aforementioned methods ignore the
effects of incentives when dealing with human inputs. It has been observed both in theory and
practice that, without appropriate incentive, selfish and rational workers tend to contribute low quality,
uninformative, if not malicious data [26, 18]. Existing inference algorithms are very vulnerable to
these cases - either much more redundant labels would be needed (low quality inputs), or the methods
would simply fail to work (the case where inputs are uninformative and malicious).
From the less ML side, the above quality control question has been studied in the context of incentive
mechanism design. In particular, a family of mechanisms, jointly referred as peer prediction, have
Preprint. Work in progress.
ar
X
iv
:1
80
6.
00
20
6v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
 Ju
n 2
01
8
been proposed [22, 12, 37, 4]. Existing peer prediction mechanisms focus on achieving incentive
compatibility (IC), which is defined as that truthfully reporting private data, or reporting high quality
data, maximizes workers’ expected utilities. These mechanisms achieve IC via comparing the reports
from the to-be-scored worker, against those from a randomly selected reference worker, to bypass the
challenge of no ground-truth verification. However, we note several undesirable properties of these
methods. Firstly, from learning’s perspective, collected labels contain rich information about the
ground-truth labels and workers’ labeling accuracy. Existing peer prediction mechanisms often rely
on reported data from a small subset of reference workers, which only represents a limited share of
the overall collected information. In consequence, the mechanism designer dismisses the opportunity
to leverage learning methods to generate a more credible and informative reference answer for the
purpose of evaluation. Secondly, existing peer prediction mechanisms often require a certain level
of prior knowledge about workers’ models, such as the cost of exerting efforts, and their labeling
accuracy when exerting different levels of efforts. However, this prior knowledge is difficult to obtain
under real environment. Thirdly, they often assume workers are all fully rational and always follow
the utility-maximizing strategy. Rather, they may adapt their strategies in a dynamic manner.
In this paper, we propose an inference-aided reinforcement mechanism, aiming to merge and extend
the techniques from both inference and incentive design communities to address the caveats when
they are employed alone, as discussed above. The high level idea is as follows: we collect data in a
sequential fashion. At each step, we assign workers a certain number of tasks and estimate the true
labels and workers’ strategies from their labels. Relying on the above estimates, a reinforcement
learning (RL) algorithm is prosed to uncover how workers respond to different levels of offered
payments. The RL algorithm determines the payments for the workers based on the collected
information up-to-date. By doing so, our mechanism not only incentivizes (non-)rational workers
to provide high-quality labels but also dynamically adjusts the payments according to workers’
responses to maximize the data requester’s cumulative utility. Applying standard RL solutions here
is challenging, due to unobservable states (workers’ labeling strategies) and reward (the aggregated
label accuracy) which is further due to the lack of ground-truth labels. Leveraging standard inference
methods seems to be a plausible solution at the first sight (for the purposes of estimating both the
states and reward), but we observe that existing methods tend to over-estimate the aggregated label
accuracy, which would mislead the superstructure RL algorithm.
We address the above challenges and make the following contributions: (1) We propose a Gibbs
sampling augmented Bayesian inference algorithm, which estimates workers’ labeling strategies and
the aggregated label accuracy, as done in most existing inference algorithms, but significantly lowers
the estimation bias of labeling accuracy. This lays a strong foundation for constructing correct reward
signals, which are extremely important if one wants to leverage reinforcement learning techniques.
(2) A reinforcement incentive learning (RIL) algorithm is developed to maximize the data requester’s
cumulative utility by dynamically adjusting incentive levels according to workers’ responses to
payments. (3) We prove that our Bayesian inference algorithm and RIL algorithm are incentive
compatible (IC) at each step and in the long run, respectively. (4) Experiments are conducted to test
our mechanism, which shows that our mechanism performs consistently well under different worker
models. Meanwhile, compared with the state-of-the-art peer prediction solutions, our Bayesian
inference aided mechanism can improve the robustness and lower the variances of payments.
2 Related Work
Our work is inspired by the following three lines of literature:
Peer Prediction: This line of work, addressing the incentive issues of eliciting high quality data
without verification, starts roughly with the seminal ones [22, 9]. A series of follow-ups have relaxed
various assumptions that have been made [12, 37, 23, 4].
Inference method: Recently, inference methods have been applied to crowdsourcing settings, aiming
to uncover the true labels from multiple noisily copies. Notable successes include EM method
[5, 24, 39], Variational Inference [16, 3] and Minimax Entropy Inference [42, 41]. Besides, Zheng et
al. [40] provide a good survey for the existing ones.
Reinforcement Learning: Over the past two decades, reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms have
been proposed to iteratively improve the acting agent’s learned policy [36, 33, 31, 10, 32]. More
recently, with the help of advances in feature extraction and state representation, RL has made
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several breakthroughs in achieving human-level performance in challenging domains [20, 14, 34, 27].
Meanwhile, many studies successfully deploy RL to address some societal problems [38, 13]. RL
has also helped make progress in human-agent collaboration [7, 8, 25, 35].
Our work differs from the above literature in the connection between incentive mechanisms and
ML. There have been a very few recent studies that share a similar research taste with us. For
example, to improve the data requester’s utility in crowdsourcing settings, Liu and Chen [18] develop
a multi-armed bandit algorithm to adjust the state-of-the-art peer prediction mechanism DG13 [4] to a
prior-free setting. Nonetheless, the results in above work require workers to follow a Nash Equilibrium
at each step in a sequential setting, which is hard to achieve in practice. Instead of randomly choosing
a reference worker as commonly done in peer prediction, Liu and Chen [17] propose to use supervised
learning algorithms to generate the reference reports and derive the corresponding IC conditions.
However, these reports need to be based on the contextual information of the tasks. By contrast, in
this paper, without assuming the contextual information about the tasks, we use Bayesian inference
to learn workers’ states and true labels, which leads to an unsupervised-learning solution.
3 Problem Formulation
This paper considers the following data acquisition problem via crowdsourcing: at each discrete time
step t = 1, 2, ..., a data requester assigns M tasks with binary answer space {−1,+1} to N ≥ 3
candidate workers to label. Workers receive payments for submitting a label for each task. We use
Lti(j) to denote the label worker i generates for task j at time t. For simplicity of computation,
we reserve Lti(j) = 0 if j is not assigned to i. Furthermore, we use L and L to denote the set of
ground-truth labels and the set of all collected labels respectively.
The generated label Lti(j) depends both on the latent ground-truth L(j) and worker i’s strategy,
which is mainly determined by two factors: exerted effort level (high or low) and reporting strategy
(truthful or deceitful). Accommodating the notation commonly used in reinforcement learning, we
also refer worker i’s strategy as his/her internal state. At any given time, workers at their will adopt
an arbitrary combination of effort level and reporting strategy. Specifically, we define eftti ∈ [0, 1]
and rptti ∈ [0, 1] as worker i’s probability of exerting high efforts and reporting truthfully for task j,
respectively. Furthermore, we use Pi,H and Pi,L to denote worker i’s probability of observing the
true label when exerting high and low efforts, respectively. Correspondingly, we denote worker i’s
cost of exerting high and low efforts by ci,H and ci,L, respectively. For the simplicity of analysis,
we assume that Pi,H > Pi,L = 0.5 and ci,H > ci,L = 0. All the above parameters and workers’
actions stay unknown to our mechanism. In other words, we regard workers as black-boxes, which
distinguishes our mechanism from the existing peer prediction mechanisms.
Worker i’s probability of being correct (PoBC) at time t for any given task is given as
Pti = rptti · eftti · Pi,H + (1− rptti) · eftti · (1− Pi,H)+
rptti · (1− eftti) · Pi,L + (1− rptti) · (1− eftti) · (1− Pi,L)
(1)
Suppose we assign mti ≤M tasks to worker i at step t. Then, a risk-neutral worker’s utility satisfies:
uti =
∑M
j=1
P ti (j)−mti · ci,H · eftti (2)
where P ti denotes our payment to worker i for task j at time t (see Section 4 for more details).
At the beginning of each step, the data requester and workers agree to a certain rule of payment,
which is not changed until the next time step. The workers are self-interested and may choose their
strategies in labeling and reporting according to the expected utility he/she can get. After collecting
the generated labels, the data requester infers the true labels L˜t(j) by running a certain inference
algorithm. The aggregated label accuracy At and the data requester’s utility rt are defined as follows:
At =
1
M
∑M
j=1
1
[
L˜t(j) = L(j)
]
, rt = F (A
t)− η
∑N
i=1
∑M
j=1
P ti (j) (3)
where F (·) is a non-decreasing monotonic function mapping accuracy to utility and η > 0 is a tunable
parameter balancing label quality and costs.
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Figure 1: Overview of our incentive mechanism.
4 Inference-Aided Reinforcement Mechanism for Crowdsourcing
Our mechanism mainly consists of three components: the payment rule, Bayesian inference and
reinforcement incentive learning (RIL); see Figure 1 for an overview, where estimated values are
denoted with tildes. The payment rule computes the payment to worker i for his/her label on task j
P ti (j) = at · [scti(j)− 0.5] + b (4)
where at ∈ A denotes the scaling factor, determined by RIL at the beginning of every step t and
shared by all workers. scti(j) denotes worker i’s score on task j, which will be computed by
the Bayesian inference algorithm. b ≥ 0 is a constant representing the fixed base payment. The
Bayesian inference algorithm is also responsible for estimating the true labels, workers’ PoBCs and
the aggregated label accuracy at each time step, preparing the necessary inputs to RIL. Based on these
estimates, RIL seeks to maximize the cumulative utility of the data requester by optimally balancing
the utility (accuracy in labels) and the payments.
4.1 Bayesian Inference
For the simplicity of notation, we omit the superscript t in this subsection. The motivation for
designing our own Bayesian inference algorithm is as follows. We ran several preliminary experiments
using popular inference algorithms, for example, EM [5, 24, 39] and Variational Inference [16, 3]).
Our empirical studies reveal that those methods tend to heavily bias towards over-estimating the
aggregated label accuracy when the quality of labels is low.1 This leads to biased estimation of the
data requester’s utility rt (as it cannot be observed directly), and this estimated utility is used as the
reward signal in RIL, which will be detailed later. Since the reward signal plays the core role in
guiding the reinforcement learning process, the heavy bias will severely mislead our mechanism.
To reduce the estimation bias, we develop a Bayesian inference algorithm by introducing soft Dirichlet
priors to both the distribution of true labels τ = [τ−1, τ+1] ∼ Dir(β−1, β+1), where τ−1 and τ+1
denote that of label −1 and +1, respectively, and workers’ PoBCs [Pi, 1− Pi] ∼ Dir(α1, α2). Then,
we derive the conditional distribution of true labels given collected labels as (see Appendix A)
P(L|L) = P(L,L)/P(L) ∝ B(βˆ) ·∏Ni=1B(αˆi), where B(x, y) = (x− 1)!(y − 1)!/(x+ y − 1)!
denotes the beta function, αˆ = [αˆ1, αˆ2], βˆ = [βˆ−1, βˆ+1], αˆi1 =
∑M
j=1
∑
k∈{−1,+1}δijkξjk+2α1−1,
αˆi2 =
∑M
j=1
∑
k∈{−1,+1}δij(−k)ξjk + 2α2 − 1 and βˆk =
∑M
j=1ξjk + 2βk − 1, where δijk =
1(Li(j) = k) and ξjk = 1(L(j) = k).
Note that it is generally hard to derive an explicit formula for the posterior distribution of a specific task
j’s ground-truth from the conditional distribution P(L|L). We thus resort to Gibbs sampling for the
inference. More specifically, according to Bayes’ theorem, we know that the conditional distribution
of task j’s ground-truth L(j) satisfies P[L(j)|L,L(−j)] ∝ P(L|L), where −j denotes all tasks
excluding j. Leveraging this, we generate samples of the true label vector L following Algorithm 1.
At each step of the sampling procedure (lines 6-7), Algorithm 1 first computes P[L(j)|L,L(−j)]
1See Section 5.1 for detailed experiment results and analysis.
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and then generates a new sample of L(j) to replace the old one in L˜. After traversing through all
tasks, Algorithm 1 generates a new sample of the true label vector L. Repeating this process for W
times, we get W samples, which is recorded in S. Here, we write the s-th sample as L˜(s). Since
Gibbs sampling requires a burn-in process, we discard the first W0 samples and calcualte worker i’s
score on task j and PoBC as
scti(j) =
∑W
s=W0
1
[
L˜(s)(j) = Li(j)
]
W −W0 , P˜i =
W∑
s=W0
[
2α1 − 1 +
M∑
j=1
1(L˜(s)(j) = Li(j))
]
(W −W0) · (2α1 + 2α2 − 2 +mi) . (5)
Similarly, we can obtain the estimates of the true label distribution τ and then derive the log-ratio
of task j, σj = log(P[L(j) = −1]/P[L(j) = +1]). Furthermore, we decide the true label estimate
L˜(j) as −1 if σ˜j > 0 and as +1 if σ˜j < 0. Correspondingly, the label accuracy A is estimated as
A˜ = E (A) = M−1
∑M
j=1
e|σ˜j |
(
1 + e|σ˜j |
)−1
. (6)
Algorithm 1 Gibbs sampling for crowdsourcing
1: Input: the collected labels L, the number of samples W
2: Output: the sample sequence S
3: S ← ∅, Initialize L with the uniform distribution
4: for s = 1 toW do
5: for j = 1 toM do
6: L(j)← 1 and compute x1 = B(βˆ)∏Ni=1B(αˆi)
7: L(j)← 2 and compute x2 = B(βˆ)∏Ni=1B(αˆi)
8: L ← Sample {1, 2} with P (1) = x1/(x1 + x2)
9: Append L˜ to the sample sequence S
In our Bayesian inference algorithm,
workers’ scores, PoBCs and the true
label distribution are all estimated by
comparing the true label samples with
the collected labels. Thus, t To prove
the convergence of our algorithm, we
need to bound the ratio of wrong sam-
ples. We introduce n and m to de-
note the number of tasks of which
the true label sample in Eqn. (5) is
correct (L˜(s)(j) = L(j)) and wrong
(L˜(s)(j) 6= L(j)) in the s-th sample,
respectively. Formally, we have:
Lemma 1. Let P¯ = 1− P, Pˆ = max{P, P¯} and P0 = τ−1. When M  1,
E[m/M ] . (1 + eδ)−1(ε+ eδ)(1 + ε)M−1 , E[m/M ]2 . (1 + eδ)−1(ε2 + eδ)(1 + ε)M−2 (7)
where ε−1 =
∏N
i=0(2Pˆi)2, δ = O[∆ · log(M)] and ∆ =
∑N
i=1[1(Pi < 0.5)− 1(Pi > 0.5)].
The proof is in Appendix B. Our main idea is to introduce a set of counts for the collected labels and
then calculate E[m/M ] and E[m/M ]2 based on the distribution of these counts. Using Lemma 1,
the convergence of our Bayesian inference algorithm states as follows:
Theorem 1 (Convergence). WhenM  1 and∏Ni=0(2Pˆi)2 ≥M , if most of workers report truthfully
(i.e. ∆ < 0), with probability at least 1− δ ∈ (0, 1), |P˜i − Pi| ≤ O(1/
√
δM) holds for any worker
i’s PoBC estimate P˜i as well as the true label distribution estimate (τ˜−1 = P˜0).
The convergence of P˜i and τ˜ can naturally lead to the convergence of σ˜j and A˜ because the latter
estimates are fully computed based on the former ones. All these convergence guarantees enable us
to use the estimates computed by Bayesian inference to construct the state and reward signal in our
reinforcement learning algorithm RIL.
4.2 Reinforcement Incentive Learning
In this subsection, we formally introduce our reinforcement incentive learning (RIL) algorithm, which
adjusts the scaling factor at to maximize the data requesters’ utility accumulated in the long run.
To fully understand the technical background, readers are expected to be familiar with Q-value and
function approximation. For readers with limited knowledge, we kindly refer them to Appendix D,
where we provide background on these concepts. With transformation, our problem can be perfectly
modeled as a Markov Decision Process. To be more specific, our mechanism is the agent and it
interacts with workers (i.e. the environment); scaling factor at is the action; the utility of the data
requester rt defined in Eqn. (3) is the reward. Workers’ reporting strategies are the state. After
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receiving payments, workers may change their strategies to, for example, increase their utilities at the
next step. How workers change their strategies forms the state transition kernel.
On the other hand, the reward rt defined in Eqn. (3) cannot be directly used because the true accuracy
At cannot be observed. Thus, we use the estimated accuracy A˜ calculated by Eqn. (6) instead to
approximate rt as in Eqn. (8). Furthermore, to achieve better generalization across different states,
it is a common approach to learn a feature-based state representation φ(s) [20, 14]. Recall that the
data requester’s implicit utility at time t only depends on the aggregated PoBC averaged across all
workers. Such observation already points out to a representation design with good generalization,
namely φ(st) =
∑N
i=1Pti/N . Further recall that, when deciding the current scaling factor at, the
data requester does not observe the latest workers’ PoBCs and thus cannot directly estimate the
current φ(st). Due to this one-step delay, we have to build our state representation using the previous
observation. Since most workers would only change their internal states after receiving a new
incentive, there exists some imperfect mapping function φ(st) ≈ f(φ(st−1), at−1). Utilizing this
implicit function, we introduce the augmented state representation in RIL as sˆt in Eqn. (8).
rt ≈ F (A˜t)− η
∑N
i=1
P ti , sˆt = 〈φ(st−1), at−1〉. (8)
Since neither rt nor st can be perfectly inferred, it would not be a surprise to observe some noise that
cannot be directly learned in our Q-function. For most crowdsourcing problems the number of tasks
M is large, so we can leverage the central limit theorem to justify our modeling of the noise using a
Gaussian process. To be more specific, we calculate the temporal difference (TD) error as
rt ≈ Qpi(sˆt, at)− γEpiQpi(sˆt+1, at+1) + t (9)
Algorithm 2 Reinforcement Incentive Learning (RIL)
1: for each episode do
2: for each step in the episode do
3: Decide the scaling factor as (-greedy method)
at =
{
argmaxa∈AQ(sˆt, a) Probability 1− 
Random a ∈ A Probability 
4: Assign tasks and collect labels from the workers
5: Run Bayesian inference to get sˆt+1 and rt
6: Use (sˆt, at, rt) to updateK,H and r in Eqn. (10)
where the noise t follows a Gaus-
sian process, and pi = P(a|sˆ) denotes
the current policy. By doing so, we
gain two benefits. First, the approx-
imation greatly simplifies the deriva-
tion of the update equation for the Q-
function. Secondly, as shown in our
empirical results later, this kind of ap-
proximation is robust against differ-
ent worker models. Besides, follow-
ing [8] we approximate Q-function as
Qpi(sˆt+1, at+1) ≈ EpiQpi(sˆt+1, at+1) + pi , where pi also follows a Gaussian process.
Under the Gaussian process approximation, all the observed rewards and the corresponding Q values
up to the current step t form a system of equations, and it can be written as r = HQ+N , where r,
Q andN denote the collection of rewards, Q values, and residuals. Following Gaussian process’s
assumption for residuals, N ∼ N (0,σ2), where σ2 = diag(σ2, . . . , σ2). The matrix H satisfies
H(k, k) = 1 andH(k, k + 1) = −γ for k = 1, . . . , t. Then, by using the online Gaussian process
regression algorithm [7], we effectively learn the Q-function as
Q(sˆ, a) = k(sˆ, a)T(K + σ2)−1H−1r (10)
where k(sˆ, a) = [k((sˆ, a), (sˆ1, a1)), . . . , k((sˆ, a), (st, at))]T and K = [k(sˆ1, a1), . . . ,k(sˆt, at)].
Here, we use k(·, ·) to denote the Gaussian kernel. Finally, we employ the classic -greedy method to
decide at based on the learned Q-function. To summarize, we provide a formal description about RIL
in Algorithm 2. Note that, when updatingK,H and r in Line 6, we employ the sparse approximation
proposed in [8] to discard some data so that the size of these matrices does not increase infinitely.
5 Theoretical Analysis on Incentive Compatibility
In this section, we prove the incentive compatibility of our Bayesian inference and reinforcement
learning algorithms. Our main results are as follows:
Theorem 2 (One Step IC). At any time step t, when M  1, ∏Ni=1(2Pi,H)2 ≥ M, at >
maxi ci,H/(Pi,H − 0.5), reporting truthfully and exerting high efforts is the utility-maximizing
strategy for any worker i at equilibrium (if other workers all follow this strategy).
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Proof. In Appendix E, we prove that when at > ci,H/(Pi,H − 0.5), if P˜ti ≈ Pti, any worker i’s
utility-maximizing strategy would be reporting truthfully and exerting high efforts. Since Theorem 1
has provided the convergence guarantee, we can conclude Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Long Term IC). Suppose the conditions in Theorem 2 are satisfied and the learned
Q-function approaches the real Qpi(sˆ, a). When the following equation holds for i = 1, . . . , N ,
ηM
∑
x6=i
Px,H ·GA > F (1)− F (1− ψi)
1− γ , ψi =
(
τ−1
τ+1
+
τ+1
τ−1
)∏
x 6=i
√
4Px,H(1− Px,H) (11)
always reporting truthfully and exerting high efforts is the utility-maximizing strategy for any worker
i in the long term if other workers all follow this strategy. Here, GA = mina,b∈A,a6=b |a− b| denotes
the minimal gap between two available values of the scaling factor.
In order to induce RIL to change actions, worker i must let RIL learn a wrong Q-function. Thus,
our main idea of proof is to derive the upper bounds of the effects of worker i’s reports on the
Q-function. Besides, Theorem 3 points that, to design robust reinforcement learning algorithms
against the manipulation of strategical agents, we should leave a certain level of gaps between actions.
This observation may be of independent interests to reinforcement learning researchers.
6 Empirical Experiments
In this section, we empirically investigate the competitiveness of our solution. To be more specific,
we first show our proposed Bayesian inference algorithm can produce more accurate estimates about
the aggregated label accuracy when compared with the existing inference algorithms. Then, we
demonstrate that, aided by Bayesian inference, our RIL algorithm consistently manages to learn
a good incentive policy under various worker models. Lastly, we show as a bonus benefit of our
mechanism that, leveraging Bayesian inference to fully exploit the information contained in the
collected labels leads to more robust and lower-variance payments at each step.
6.1 Empirical Analysis on Bayesian Inference
The aggregated label accuracy estimated from our Bayesian inference algorithm serves as a major
component of the state representation and reward function to RIL, and thus critically affects the
performance of our mechanism. Given so, we choose to first investigate the bias of our Bayesian
inference algorithm. In Figure 2a, we compare our Bayesian inference algorithm with two popular
inference algorithms in crowdsourcing, that is, the EM estimator [24] and the variational inference
estimator [16]. Here, we employ the famous RTE dataset, where workers need to check whether a
hypothesis sentence can be inferred from the provided sentence [30]. In order to simulate strategic
behaviors of workers, we mix these data with random noise by replacing a part of real-world labels
with uniformly generated ones (low quality labels).
From the figure, we conclude that compared with EM and variational inference, our Bayesian
inference algorithm can significantly lower the bias of the estimates of the aggregated label accuracy.
In fact, we cannot use the estimates from the EM and variational inference as alternatives for the
reward signal because the biases of their estimates even reach 0.45 while the range of the label
accuracy is only between [0.5, 1.0]. This set of experiments justifies our motivation to develop
our own inference algorithm and reinforces our claim that our inference algorithm could provide
fundamentals for the further development of potential learning algorithms for crowdsourcing.
6.2 Empirical Analysis on RIL
We move on to investigate whether RIL consistently learns a good policy, which maximizes the data
requester’s cumulative utility R =
∑
t rt. For all the experiments in this subsection, we setM = 100,
N = 10, PH = 0.9, b = 0, cH = 0.02, the set of the scaling factor A = {0.1, 1.0, 5.0, 10}, the
exploration rate  = 0.2 for RIL and F (A) = A10, η = 0.001 for the utility function (Eqn. (3))
and the number of time steps for an episode as 28. We report the averaged results over 5 runs to
reduce the effect of outliers. To demonstrate our algorithm’s general applicability, we test it under
three different worker models, each representing a popular family of human behavioral model. We
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Figure 2: Empirical analysis on Bayesian Inference (a) and RIL (b-c). To be more specific, (a)
compares the inference bias (i.e. the difference from the inferred label accuracy to the real one) of
our Bayesian inference algorithm with that of EM and variational inference, averaged over 100 runs.
(b) draws the gap between the estimation of the data requester’s cumulative utility and the real one,
smoothed over 5 episodes. (c) shows the learning curve of our mechanism, smoothed over 5 episodes.
Table 1: Performance comparison under three worker models. Data requester’s cumulative utility
normalized over the number of tasks. Standard deviation reported in parenthesis.
METHOD RATIONAL QR MWU
FIXED OPTIMAL 27.584 (.253) 21.004 (.012) 11.723 (.514)
HEURISTIC OPTIMAL 27.643 (.174) 21.006 (.001) 12.304 (.515)
ADAPTIVE OPTIMAL 27.835 (.209) 21.314 (.011) 17.511 (.427)
RIL 27.184 (.336) 21.016 (.018) 15.726 (.416)
provide a simple description of them as follows, whereas the detailed version is deferred to Appendix
H. (i) Rational workers alway take the utility-maximizing strategies. (ii) QR workers [19] follow
strategies corresponding to an utility-dependent distribution (which is pre-determined). This model
has been used to study agents with bounded rationality. (iii) MWU workers [15] update their strategies
according to the celebrated multiplicative weights update algorithm. This model has been used to
study adaptive learning agents.
Our first set of experiments is a continuation to the last subsection. To be more specific, we first focus
on the estimation bias of the data requester’s cumulative utility R. This value is used as the reward in
RIL and is calculated from the estimates of the aggregated label accuracy. This set of experiments
aim to investigate whether our RIL module successfully leverages the label accuracy estimates and
picks up the right reward signal. As Figure 2b shows, the estimates only deviate from the real values
in a very limited magnitude after a few episodes of learning, regardless of which worker model the
experiments run with. The results further demonstrate that our RIL module observe reliable rewards.
The next set of experiments is about how quickly RIL learns. As Figure 2c shows, under all three
worker models, RIL manages to pick up and stick to a promising policy in less than 100 episodes.
This observation also demonstrates the robustness of RIL under different environments.
Our last set of experiments in this subsection aim to evaluate the competitiveness of the policy learned
by RIL. In Table 1, we use the policy learned after 500 episodes with exploration rate turned off (i.e.
 = 0) and compare it with three benchmarks constructed by ourselves. To create the first one, Fixed
Optimal, we try all 4 possible fixed value for the scaling factor and report the highest cumulative
reward realized by either of them. To create the second one, Heuristic Optimal, we divide the value
region of A˜t into five regions: [0, 0.6), [0.6, 0.7), [0.7, 0.8), [0.8, 0.9) and [0.9, 1.0]. For each region,
we select a fixed value for the scaling factor at. We traverse all 45 = 1024 possible combinations to
decide the optimal heuristic strategy. To create the third one, Adaptive Optimal, we change the scaling
factor every 4 steps and report the highest cumulative reward via traversing all 47 = 16384 possible
configurations. This benchmark is infeasible to be reproduced in real-world practice, once the number
of steps becomes large. Yet it is very close to the global optimal in the sequential setting. As Table 1
demonstrates, the two benchmarks plus RIL all achieve a similar performance tested under rational
and QR workers. This is because these two kinds of workers have a fixed pattern in responding to
incentives and thus the optimal policy would be a fixed scaling factor throughout the whole episode.
On contrast, MWU workers adaptively learn utility-maximizing strategies gradually, and the learning
process is affected by the incentives. Under this worker environment, RIL managers to achieve an
average utility score of 15.6, which is a significant improvement over fixed optimal and heuristic
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Figure 3: Empirical analysis on our Bayesian inference algorithm, averaged over 1000 runs. (a)
Average payment per task given true label’s distribution. (b) Average payment per task given PoBCs
of workers excluding i. (c) The standard deviation of the payment given worker i’s PoBC.
optimal (which achieve 11.7 and 12.3 respectively) considering the unrealistic global optimal is only
around 18.5. Up to this point, with three sets of experiments, we demonstrate the competitiveness
of RIL and its robustness under different work environments. Note that, when constructing the
benchmarks, we also conduct experiments on DG13, the state-of-the-art peer prediction mechanism
for binary labels [4], and get the same conclusion. For example, when DG13 and MWU workers
are tested for Fixed Optimal and Heuristic Optimal, the cumulative utilities are 11.537(.397) and
11.908(0.210), respectively, which also shows a large gap with RIL.
6.3 Empirical Analysis on One Step Payments
In this subsection, we compare the one step payments provided by our mechanism with the payments
calculated by DG13, the state-of-the-art peer prediction mechanism for binary labels [4]. We fix
the scaling factor at = 1 and set M = 100, N = 10, PH = 0.8, b = 0 and mti = 90. To set up
the experiments, we generate task j’s true label L(j) following its distribution τ (to be specified)
and worker i’s label for task j based on i’s PoBC Pi and L(j). In Figure 3a, we let all workers
excluding i report truthfully and exert high efforts (i.e. P−i = PH ), and increase τ+1 from 0.05 to
0.95. In Figure 3b, we let τ+1 = 0.5, and increase other workers’ PoBCs P−i from 0.6 to 0.95. As
both figures reveal, in our mechanism, the payment for worker i almost only depends on his/her
own strategy. On contrast, in DG13, the payments are clearly affected by the distribution of true
labels and the strategies of other workers. In other words, our Bayesian inference is more robust to
different environments. Furthermore, in Figure 3c, we present the standard deviation of the payment
to worker i. We let τ+1 = 0.5, P−i = PH and increase Pi from 0.6 to 0.95. As shown in the figure,
our method manages to achieve a noticeably smaller standard deviation compared to DG13. Note
that, in Figure 3b, we implicitly assume that most of workers will at least not adversarially report
false labels, which is widely-adopted in previous studies [16]. For workers’ collusion attacks, we
also have some defending tricks provided in Appendix F.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we build an inference-aided reinforcement mechanism leveraging Bayesian inference
and reinforcement learning techniques to learn the optimal policy to incentivize high-quality labels
from crowdsourcing. Our mechanism is proved to be incentive compatible. Empirically, we show that
our Bayesian inference algorithm can help improve the robustness and lower the variance of payments,
which are favorable properties in practice. Meanwhile, our reinforcement incentive learning (RIL)
algorithm ensures our mechanism to perform consistently well under different worker models.
Acknowledgments
This work was conducted within Rolls-Royce@NTU Corporate Lab with support from the National
Research Foundation (NRF) Singapore under the Corp Lab@University Scheme. Yitao is partially
supported by NSF grants #IIS-1657613, #IIS-1633857 and DARPA XAI grant #N66001-17-2-4032.
The authors also thank Anxiang Zeng from Alibaba Group for valuable discussions.
9
References
[1] R. Arratia and L. Gordon. Tutorial on large deviations for the binomial distribution. Bulletin of
Mathematical Biology, 51(1):125–131, Jan 1989.
[2] Erick Chastain, Adi Livnat, Christos Papadimitriou, and Umesh Vazirani. Algorithms, games,
and evolution. PNAS, 111(29):10620–10623, 2014.
[3] Xi Chen, Qihang Lin, and Dengyong Zhou. Statistical decision making for optimal budget
allocation in crowd labeling. Journal of Machine Learning Research, 16:1–46, 2015.
[4] Anirban Dasgupta and Arpita Ghosh. Crowdsourced judgement elicitation with endogenous
proficiency. In Proc. of WWW, 2013.
[5] Alexander Philip Dawid and Allan M Skene. Maximum likelihood estimation of observer
error-rates using the em algorithm. Applied statistics, pages 20–28, 1979.
[6] Djellel Eddine Difallah, Michele Catasta, Gianluca Demartini, Panagiotis G Ipeirotis, and
Philippe Cudre´-Mauroux. The dynamics of micro-task crowdsourcing: The case of amazon
mturk. In Proc. of WWW, 2015.
[7] Yaakov Engel, Shie Mannor, and Ron Meir. Reinforcement learning with gaussian processes.
In Proc. of ICML, 2005.
[8] Milica Gasic and Steve Young. Gaussian processes for pomdp-based dialogue manager opti-
mization. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Audio, Speech, and Language Processing, 22(1):28–40,
2014.
[9] Tilmann Gneiting and Adrian E Raftery. Strictly proper scoring rules, prediction, and estimation.
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 102(477):359–378, 2007.
[10] Geoffrey J. Gordon. Reinforcement Learning with Function Approximation Converges to a
Region. In Proceedings of the Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems (NIPS),
pages 1040–1046, 2000.
[11] Jeff Howe. The rise of crowdsourcing. Wired Magazine, 14(6), 06 2006.
[12] Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings, et al. Mechanisms for making crowds truthful. Journal of Artificial
Intelligence Research, 34(1):209, 2009.
[13] Joel Z. Leibo, Vinicius Zambaldi, Marc Lanctot, Janusz Marecki, and Thore Graepel. Multi-
agent reinforcement learning in sequential social dilemmas. In Proc. of AAMAS, 2017.
[14] Yitao Liang, Marlos C. Machado, Erik Talvitie, and Michael Bowling. State of the art control
of atari games using shallow reinforcement learning. In Proc. of AAMAS, 2016.
[15] Nick Littlestone and Manfred K Warmuth. The weighted majority algorithm. Information and
computation, 108(2):212–261, 1994.
[16] Qiang Liu, Jian Peng, and Alexander T Ihler. Variational inference for crowdsourcing. In Proc.
of NIPS, 2012.
[17] Yang Liu and Yiling Chen. Machine-learning aided peer prediction. In Proc. of ACM EC, 2017.
[18] Yang Liu and Yiling Chen. Sequential peer prediction: Learning to elicit effort using posted
prices. In Proc. of AAAI, pages 607–613, 2017.
[19] Richard D McKelvey and Thomas R Palfrey. Quantal response equilibria for normal form
games. Games and economic behavior, 10(1):6–38, 1995.
[20] Volodymyr Mnih, Koray Kavukcuoglu, David Silver, Andrei A. Rusu, Joel Veness, Marc G.
Bellemare, Alex Graves, Martin Riedmiller, Andreas K. Fidjeland, Georg Ostrovski, Stig Pe-
tersen, Charles Beattie, Amir Sadik, Ioannis Antonoglou, Helen King, Dharshan Kumaran, Daan
Wierstra, Shane Legg, and Demis Hassabis. Human-level Control through Deep Reinforcement
Learning. Nature, 518(7540):529–533, 02 2015.
[21] Frank W. J. Olver. NIST Handbook of Mathematical Functions. Cambridge University Press,
2010.
[22] Drazˇen Prelec. A bayesian truth serum for subjective data. Science, 306(5695):462–466, 2004.
[23] Goran Radanovic and Boi Faltings. A robust bayesian truth serum for non-binary signals. In
Proc. of AAAI, 2013.
10
[24] Vikas C Raykar, Shipeng Yu, Linda H Zhao, Gerardo Hermosillo Valadez, Charles Florin,
Luca Bogoni, and Linda Moy. Learning from crowds. Journal of Machine Learning Research,
11(Apr):1297–1322, 2010.
[25] Vidyasagar Sadhu, Gabriel Salles-Loustau, Dario Pompili, Saman A. Zonouz, and Vincent Sri-
tapan. Argus: Smartphone-enabled human cooperation via multi-agent reinforcement learning
for disaster situational awareness. In Proc. of ICAC, 2016.
[26] Victor S Sheng, Foster Provost, and Panagiotis G Ipeirotis. Get another label? improving data
quality and data mining using multiple, noisy labelers. In Proc. of SIGKDD, 2008.
[27] David Silver, Julian Schrittwieser, Karen Simonyan, Ioannis Antonoglou, Aja Huang, Arthur
Guez, Thomas Hubert, Lucas Baker, Matthew Lai, Adrian Bolton, Yutian Chen, Timothy
Lillicrap, Fan Hui, Laurent Sifre, George van den Driessche, Thore Graepel, and Demis
Hassabis. Mastering the game of go without human knowledge. Nature, 550:354 EP –, 10 2017.
[28] Edwin D Simpson, Matteo Venanzi, Steven Reece, Pushmeet Kohli, John Guiver, Stephen J
Roberts, and Nicholas R Jennings. Language understanding in the wild: Combining crowd-
sourcing and machine learning. In Proc. of WWW, 2015.
[29] Aleksandrs Slivkins and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan. Online decision making in crowdsourcing
markets: Theoretical challenges. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 12(2):4–23, 2014.
[30] Rion Snow, Brendan O’Connor, Daniel Jurafsky, and Andrew Y Ng. Cheap and fast—but is it
good?: evaluating non-expert annotations for natural language tasks. In Proc. of EMNLP, 2008.
[31] Richard S. Sutton and Andrew G. Barto. Reinforcement Learning: An Introduction. MIT Press,
1998.
[32] Csaba Szepesva´ri. Algorithms for Reinforcement Learning. Synthesis lectures on Artificial
Intelligence and Machine Learning. Morgan & Claypool, 2010.
[33] Gerald Tesauro. Temporal Difference Learning and TD-Gammon. Communications of the ACM,
38(3):58–68, March 1995.
[34] Hado van Hasselt, Arthur Guez, and David Silver. Deep reinforcement learning with double
q-learning. In AAAI, 2016.
[35] Yue Wang and Fumin Zhang. Trends in Control and Decision-Making for Human-Robot
Collaboration Systems. Springer Publishing Company, Incorporated, 1st edition, 2017.
[36] Christopher J. C. H. Watkins and Peter Dayan. Technical Note: Q-Learning. Machine Learning,
8(3-4), May 1992.
[37] Jens Witkowski and David C Parkes. Peer prediction without a common prior. In Proc. of ACM
EC, 2012.
[38] Chao Yu, Minjie Zhang, and Fenghui Ren. Emotional multiagent reinforcement learning in
social dilemmas. In PRIMA, 2013.
[39] Yuchen Zhang, Xi Chen, Denny Zhou, and Michael I Jordan. Spectral methods meet em: A
provably optimal algorithm for crowdsourcing. In Proc. of NIPS, 2014.
[40] Yudian Zheng, Guoliang Li, Yuanbing Li, Caihua Shan, and Reynold Cheng. Truth inference in
crowdsourcing: is the problem solved? Proc. of the VLDB Endowment, 10(5):541–552, 2017.
[41] Dengyong Zhou, Qiang Liu, John Platt, and Christopher Meek. Aggregating ordinal labels from
crowds by minimax conditional entropy. In Proc. of ICML, 2014.
[42] Denny Zhou, Sumit Basu, Yi Mao, and John C Platt. Learning from the wisdom of crowds by
minimax entropy. In Proc. of NIPS, 2012.
Appendix
A Derivation of Posterior Distribution
It is not had to figure out the joint distribution of the collected labels L and the true labels L
P(L,L|θ, τ ) =
∏M
j=1
∏
k∈{−1,+1}
{
τk
N∏
i=1
Pδijki (1− Pi)δij(−k)
}ξjk
(12)
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where θ = [P1, . . . ,PN ] and τ = [τ−1, τ+1]. τ−1 and τ+1 denote the distribution of true label −1
and +1, respectively. Besides, δijk = 1(Li(j) = k) and ξjk = 1(L(j) = k). Then, the joint
distribution of L, L, θ and τ
P(L,L,p, τ ) = P(L,L|p, τ ) · P(θ, τ )
=
1
B(β)
∏
k∈{−1,+1}
τ
βˆ∗k−1
k ·
N∏
i=1
1
B(α)
p
αˆ∗i1−1
i (1− pi)αˆ
∗
i2−1 (13)
where B(x, y) = (x− 1)!(y − 1)!/(x+ y − 1)! denotes the beta function, and
αˆ∗i1 =
∑M
j=1
∑K
k=1
δijkξjk + α1
αˆ∗i2 =
∑M
j=1
∑K
k=1
δij(3−k)ξjk + α2
βˆ∗k =
∑M
j=1
ξjk + βk.
In this case, we can conduct marginalization via integrating the joint distribution P(L,L,p, τ ) over
θ and τ as
P (L,L|α,β) = B(βˆ)
B(β)
·
∏N
i=1
B(αˆi)
[B(α)]2
(14)
where αˆi = [αˆ∗i1 + α1 − 1, αˆ∗i2 + α2 − 1] and βˆ = [βˆ∗−1 + β−1 − 1, βˆ∗+1 + β+1 − 1]. Following
Bayes’ theorem, we can know that
P (L|L) = P (L,L|α,β)
P (L|α,β) ∝ B(βˆ)
N∏
i=1
B(αˆi). (15)
B Proof for Lemma 1
B.1 Basic Lemmas
We firstly present some lemmas for our proof later.
Lemma 2. If x ∼ Bin(n, p), Etx = (1− p+ tp)n holds for any t > 0, where Bin(·) is the binomial
distribution.
Proof.
tx = ex log t = mx(log t) =
(
1− p+ pelog t)n (16)
where mx(·) denotes the moment generating function.
Lemma 3. For given n,m ≥ 0, if 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, we can have∑n
x=0
∑m
w=0
CxnC
w
mp
x+w(1− p)y+z×
B(x+ z + 1 + t, y + w + 1) =∫ 1
0
[(2p− 1)x+ 1− p]n[(1− 2p)x+ p]mxtdx
Proof. By the definition of the beta function [21],
B(x, y) =
∫ +∞
0
ux−1(1 + u)−(x+y)du (17)
we can have ∑
x,w
CxnC
w
mp
x+w(1− p)y+zB(x+ z + 1 + t, y + w + 1)
=
∫ +∞
0
Eux · Euz · ut · (1 + u)−(n+m+2+t)du (18)
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where we regard x ∼ Bin(n, p) and z ∼ Bin(m, 1− p). Thus, according to Lemma 2, we can obtain
∫ +∞
0
Eux · Euz · ut · (1 + u)−(n+m+3)du
=
∫ +∞
0
[1− p+ up]n · [p+ (1− p)u]m · ut
(1 + u)n+m+2+t
du.
(19)
For the integral operation, substituting u with v − 1 at first and then v with (1 − x)−1, we can
conclude Lemma 3.
Lemma 4.
∑N
n=0 C
n
N · xn = (1 + x)N .
Lemma 5.
∑N
n=0 C
n
N · n · xn = N · x · (1 + x)N−1.
Lemma 6.
∑N
n=0 C
n
N · n · xN−n = N · (1 + x)N−1.
Lemma 7.
∑N
n=0 C
n
N · n2 · xn = Nx(1 +Nx)(1 + x)N−2.
Lemma 8.
∑N
n=0 C
n
N · n2 · xN−n = N(x+N)(1 + x)N−2.
Lemma 9. If 0 < x < 1, we can have
bN/2c∑
n=0
CnN · xn ≥
(
1− e−cN) · (1 + x)N
N∑
n=bN/2c+1
CnN · xN−n ≥
(
1− e−cN) · (1 + x)N .
where c = 0.5(1− x)2(1 + x)−2.
Proof. To prove the lemmas above, we firstly define
Ft(x) =
N∑
n=0
CnNn
txn (20)
Then, Lemma 4 can be obtained by expanding (1 + x)N . Lemma 5 can be proved as follows
F1(x) =
N∑
n=0
CnN (n+ 1)x
n − (1 + x)N
N∑
n=0
CnN (n+ 1)x
n =
d
dx
[xF0(x)]
= Nx(1 + x)N−1 + (1 + x)N .
(21)
Lemma 6 can be obtained as follows
N∑
n=0
CnNnx
N−n = xN
N∑
n=0
CnNn
(
1
x
)n
= xN ·N · 1
x
·
(
1 +
1
x
)N−1
.
(22)
For Lemma 7, we can have
F2(x) =
N∑
n=0
CnN (n+ 2)(n+ 1)x
n − 3F1(x)− 2F0(x)
=
[
x2F0(x)
]′ − 3F1(x)− 2F0(x) (23)
Thus, we can have
F2(x) = Nx(1 +Nx)(1 + x)
N−2 (24)
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which concludes Lemma 7. Then, Lemma 8 can be obtained by considering Eqn. (25).
N∑
n=0
CnNn
2xN−n = xN
N∑
n=0
CnNn
2
(
1
x
)n
. (25)
For Lemma 9, we can have
bN/2c∑
n=0
CnNx
n = (1 + x)N
bN/2c∑
n=0
CnNp
n(1− p)N−n (26)
where p = x(1 + x)−1. Let X ∼ Bin(N, p), we can have
bN/2c∑
n=0
CnNp
n(1− p)N−n ≥ 1− P (X ≥ N/2) . (27)
Since x < 1, p < 0.5 and Np < N/2. Considering Hoeffding’s inequality, we can get
P (X ≥ N/2) ≤ exp
[
−N(1− x)
2
2(1 + x)2
]
(28)
which concludes the first inequality in Lemma 9. Similarly, for the second inequality, we can have
N∑
n=K
CnNx
N−n = (1 + x)N
N∑
n=K
CnN (1− p)npN−n (29)
where K = bN/2c+ 1. Suppose Y ∼ Bin(N, 1− p), we can have
N∑
n=K
CnN (1− p)npN−n ≥ 1− P (Y ≤ N/2) . (30)
Considering Hoeffding’s inequality, we can also get
P (Y ≤ N/2) ≤ exp
[
−N(1− x)
2
2(1 + x)2
]
(31)
which concludes the second inequality in Lemma 9.
Lemma 10. For any x, y ≥ 0, we can have
(1 + x)y ≤ exy.
Proof. Firstly, we can know (1 + x)y = ey log(1+x). Let f(x) = x − log(x). Then, we can have
f(0) = 0 and f ′(x) ≥ 0. Thus, x ≥ log(1 + x) and we can conclude Lemma 10 by taking this
inequality into the equality.
Lemma 11.
g(x) =
ex
ex + 1
is a concave function when x ∈ [0,+∞).
Proof. g′(x) = (2 + t(x))−1, where t(x) = ex + e−x. t′(x) = ex − e−x ≥ 0 when x ∈ [0,+∞).
Thus, g′(x) is monotonically decreasing when x ∈ [0,+∞), which concludes Lemma 11.
Lemma 12. For x ∈ (−∞,+∞),
h(x) =
1
e|x| + 1
satisfies
h(x) < ex and h(x) < e−x.
Proof. When x ≥ 0, we can have
h(x) <
1
ex
= e−x ≤ ex. (32)
When x ≤ 0, we can have
h(x) =
ex
ex + 1
< ex ≤ e−x. (33)
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Lemma 13. If λ = p/(1− p) and 0.5 < p < 1, then∑N
n=bN/2cC
n
Nλ
m−npn(1− p)m ≤ [4p(1− p)]N/2∑bN/2c
n=0
CnNλ
n−mpn(1− p)m ≤ [4p(1− p)]N/2
where m = N − n.
Proof. For the first inequality, we can have
N∑
n=bN/2c
CnNλ
m−npn(1− p)m (34)
=
N∑
n=bN/2c
CnNp
m(1− p)n ≤
bN/2c∑
m=0
CmN p
m(1− p)n
According to the inequality in [1], we can have
bN/2c∑
m=0
CmN p
m(1− p)n ≤ exp(−ND) (35)
where D = −0.5 log(2p)− 0.5 log(2(p− 1)), which concludes the first inequality in Lemma 13.
For the second inequality, we can have
bN/2c∑
n=0
CnNλ
n−mpn(1− p)m
=
1
[p(1− p)]N
bN/2c∑
n=0
CnN [p
3]n[(1− p)3]m
=
[p3 + (1− p)3]N
[p(1− p)]N
bN/2c∑
n=0
CnNx
n(1− x)m
(36)
where x = p3/[p3 + (1− p)3]. By using Eqn. (35), we can have
bN/2c∑
n=0
CnNλ
n−mpn(1− p)m
≤ [p
3 + (1− p)3]N
[p(1− p)]N [x(1− x)]
N/2
= [4p(1− p)]N/2
(37)
which concludes the second inequality of Lemma 13.
B.2 Main Proof
To prove Lemma 1, we need to analyze the posterior distribution of L which satisfies
P(L|L) = B(βˆ)
∏N
i=1
B(αˆi)/[Cp · P(L)] (38)
where Cp is the nomalization constant. This is because the samples are generated based on this
distribution. However, both the numerator and denominator in Eqn. (38) are changing withL, making
the distribution difficult to analyze. Thus, we derive a proper approximation for the denominator
of Eqn. (38) at first. Denote the labels generated by N workers for task j as vector L(j). The
distribution of L(j) satisfies
Pθˆ[L(j)] =
∑
k∈{−1,+1}τk
∏N
i=1
Pδijki (1− Pi)δij(−k) (39)
where θˆ = [τ−1,P1, . . . ,PN ] denotes all the parameters and δijk = 1(Li(j) = k). Then, we can
have
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Lemma 14. When M →∞,
P(L)→ CL(M) ·
∏
L(j)
{
Pθˆ[L(j)]
}M ·Pθˆ [L(j)]
where CL(M) denotes a constant that depends on M .
Proof. Denote the prior distribution of θ by pi. Then,
P (L|α,β) =
∏M
j=1
Pθ(xj)
∫
e[−M ·dKL]dpi(θˆ) (40)
dKL =
1
M
M∑
j=1
log
Pθ(xj)
Pθˆ(xj)
→ KL[Pθ(x), Pθˆ(x)] (41)
where xj denotes the labels generated for task j. The KL divergence KL[·, ·], which denotes
the expectation of the log-ratio between two probability distributions, is a constant for the given
θ and θˆ. Thus,
∫
e[−M ·dKL]dpi(θˆ) = CL(M). In addition, when M → ∞, we can also have∑
1(xj = x)→M · Pθ(x), which concludes Lemma 14.
Then, we move our focus back to the samples. To quantify the effects of the collected labels, we
introduce a set of variables to describe the real true labels and the collected labels. Among the n tasks
of which the posterior true label is correct,
• x0 and y0 denote the number of tasks of which the real true label is −1 and +1, respectively.
• xi and yi denote the number of tasks of which worker i’s label is correct and wrong,
respectively.
Also, among the remaining m = M − n tasks,
• w0 and z0 denote the number of tasks of which the real true label is−1 and +1, respectively.
• wi and zi denote the number of tasks of which worker i’s label is correct and wrong,
respectively.
Thus, we can have xi + yi = n and wi + zi = m. Besides, we use ξi to denote the combination
(xi, yi, wi, zi).
To compute the expectation ofm/M , we need to analyze the probability distribution ofm. According
to Eqn. (15), we can know that P(m) satisfies
P(m) ≈ C
m
M
Z
∑
ξ0,...,ξN
N∏
i=0
P(ξi|m)B(βˆ)
N∏
i=1
B(αˆi) (42)
where Z = CpCL
∏
x[Pθ(x)]
M ·Pθ(x) is independent of ξi and m. Meanwhile, βˆ−1 = x0 + z0 + 1,
βˆ+1 = y0 +w0 +1, αˆi1 = xi+zi+2 and αˆi2 = xi+zi+1. When them tasks of which the posterior
true label is wrong are given, we can know that xi ∼ Bin(n,Pi) and wi ∼ Bin(m,Pi), where Bin(·)
denotes the binomial distribution. In addition, xi and yi are independent of wi, zi and ξk 6=i. Also, wi
and zi are independent of xi and yi and ξk 6=i. Thus, we can further obtain P(m) ≈ Zˆ−1 · CmMY (m),
where
Y (m) = elogH(m,P0;M,0)+
∑N
i=1 logH(m,Pi;M,1)
H(m, p;M, t) =
∑n
x=0
∑m
w=0
2M+1CxnC
w
m×
px+w(1− p)y+zB(x+ z + 1 + t, y + w + 1)
(43)
and Zˆ = 2−(N+1)(M+1)Z. Considering
∑M
m=1 P(m) = 1, we can know that Zˆ ≈
∑M
m=1C
m
MY (m).
Note that, we use P0 to denote the probability of true label 1, namely τ1.
The biggest challenge of our proof exists in analyzing function H(m, p;M, t) which we put in the
next subsection (Section C.3). Here, we directly use the obtained lower and upper bounds depicted in
Lemmas 19 and 20 and can have{
eC−Klm . Y (m) . eC−Kum 2m ≤M
eC+δ−Kln . Y (m) . eC+δ−Kun 2m > M (44)
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where C = H(0,P0;M, 0) +
∑N
i=1H(0,Pi;M, 1) and
Kl =
∑N
i=0
log λˆi , Ku = 2
∑N
i=0
log
(
2Pˆi
)
δ = ∆ · log(M) +
∑N
i=1
(−1)1(Pi>0.5)φ(Pˆi)
λˆi = max
{
Pi
P¯i + 1M
,
P¯i
Pi + 1M
}
, φ(p) = log
2P− 1
P
∆ =
∑N
i=1
[1(Pi < 0.5)− 1(Pi > 0.5)].
Here, P¯ = 1− P, Pˆ = max{P, P¯} and P0 = τ−1. Besides, we set a convention that φ(p) = 0 when
p = 0.5. Thereby, the expectations of m and m2 satisfy
E[m] .
∑M
m=0me
−Kum +
∑M
m=0me
δ−Kun∑k
m=0 e
−Klm +
∑M
m=k+1 e
δ−Kln
(45)
E[m2] .
∑M
m=0m
2e−Kum +
∑M
m=0m
2eδ−Kun∑k
m=0 e
−Klm +
∑M
m=k+1 e
δ−Kln
(46)
where k = bM/2c. By using Lemmas 5, 6, 7 and 8, we can know the upper bounds of the numerator
in Eqn. (45) and (46) are M(ε+ eδ)(1 + ε)M−1 and [M2ε2 +Mε+ eδ(M2 +Mε)](1 + ε)M−2,
respectively, where ε = e−Ku . On the other hand, by using Lemma 9, we can obtain the lower
bound of the denominator as (1 + eδ)[1 − e−c(ω)M ](1 + ω)M , where ω = e−Kl and c(ω) =
0.5(1 − ω)2(1 + ω)−2. Considering M  1, we can make the approximation that e−c(ω)M ≈ 0
and (1 + eδ)ε/M ≈ 0. Besides, (1 + ω)M ≥ 1 holds because ω ≥ 0. In this case, Lemma 1 can be
concluded by combining the upper bound of the numerator and the lower bound of the denominator.
B.3 H function analysis
Here, we present our analysis on the H function defined in Eqn. (43). Firstly, we can have:
Lemma 15. H(m, 0.5;M, t) = 2(t+ 1)−1.
Lemma 16. H(m, p;M, t) = H(n, p¯;M, t).
Lemma 17. As a function of m, H(m, p;M, t) is logarithmically convex.
Proof. Lemma 15 can be proved by integrating 2xt on [0, 1]. Lemma 16 can be proved by showing
that H(n, p¯;M, t) has the same expression as H(m, p;M, t). Thus, in the following proof, we focus
on Lemma 17. Fixing p, M and t, we denote log(H) by f(m). Then, we compute the first-order
derivative as
H(m)f ′(m) = 2M+1
∫ 1
0
λun(1− u)mxtdx (47)
where u = (2p − 1)x + 1 − p and λ = log(1 − u) − log(u). Furthermore, we can solve the
second-order derivative as
2−2(M+1)H2(m)f ′′(m) =∫ 1
0
g2(x)dx
∫ 1
0
h2(x)dx−
(∫ 1
0
g(x)h(x)dx
)2 (48)
where the functions g, h : (0, 1)→ R are defined by
g = λ
√
un(1− u)m , h =
√
un(1− u)m. (49)
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,∫ 1
0
g2(x)dx
∫ 1
0
h2(x)dx ≥
(∫ 1
0
g(x)h(x)dx
)2
(50)
we can know that f ′′(m) ≥ 0 always holds, which concludes that f is convex andH is logarithmically
convex.
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Then, for the case that t = 1 and M  1, we can further derive the following three lemmas for
H(m, p;M, 1):
Lemma 18. The ratio between two ends satisfies
log
H(0, p;M, 1)
H(M,p;M, 1)
≈
{
log(M) + (p) p > 0.5
0 p = 0.5
− log(M)− (p¯) p < 0.5
where (p) = log(2p− 1)− log(p) and (p) = 0 if p = 0.5.
Lemma 19. The lower bound can be calculated as
logH(m, p) &
{
H(0, p)− kl ·m 2m ≤M
H(M,p)− kl · n 2m > M
where kl = log
(
max
{
p/(p¯+M−1), p¯/(p+M−1)
})
.
Lemma 20. The upper bound can be calculated as
logH(m, p) .
{
H(0, p)− ku ·m 2m ≤M
H(M,p)− ku · n 2m > M
where n = M −m and ku = 2 log (2 ·max {p, p¯}).
Proof. By Lemma 15, logH(m, 0.5;M, 1) ≡ 0, which proves the above three lemmas for the case
that p = 0.5. Considering the symmetry ensured by Lemma 16, we thus focus on the case that
p > 0.5 in the following proof and transform H(m, p) into the following formulation
H(m, p) = ω(p) ·
∫ p
p¯
xn(1− x)m(x− 1 + p)dx (51)
where ω(p) = 2M+1/(2p− 1)2. Then, we can solve H(0, p) and H(M,p) as
H(0, p) = ω(p)
∫ p
p¯
xM (x− p¯)dx
=
(2p)M+1
(2p− 1)(M + 1) −O
(
(2p)M+1
M2
) (52)
H(M,p) = ω(p)
∫ p
p¯
(1− x)M (x− p¯)dx
=
p(2p)M+1
(2p− 1)2(M + 1)(M + 2) −O
(
(2p¯)M+1
M + 2
)
.
(53)
Using the Taylor expansion of function log(x), we can calculate the ratio in Lemma 18 as
log
H(0, p)
H(M,p)
= log(M) + log
2p− 1
p
+O
(
1
M
)
(54)
which concludes Lemma 18 when M  1.
Furthermore, we can solve H(1, p) as
H(1, p) = ω(p)
∫ p
p¯
xM−1(x− p¯)dx−H(0, p)
=
(2p¯+M−1)(2p)M
(2p− 1)(M + 1) −O
(
(2p)M+1
M2
) (55)
The value ratio between m = 0 and m = 1 then satisfies
log
H(1, p)
H(0, p)
= log
p
p¯+M−1
+O
(
1
M
)
. (56)
By Rolle’s theorem, there exists a c ∈ [m,m+ 1] satisfying
logH(1, p)− logH(0, p) = f ′(c) (57)
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where f(m) = logH(m, p). Meanwhile, Lemma 17 ensures that f ′′(m) ≥ 0 always holds. Thus,
we can have
logH(m+ 1, p)− logH(m, p) ≥ log H(1, 0)
H(0, p)
(58)
which concludes the first case of Lemma 19. Similarly, we compute the ratio between m = M − 1
and M as
log
H(M,p)
H(M − 1, p) = log
p
p¯+M−1
+O
(
1
M
)
. (59)
Meanwhile, Rolle’s theorem and Lemma 17 ensure that
logH(m, p)− logH(m− 1, p) ≤ log H(M, 0)
H(M − 1, p) (60)
which concludes the second case of Lemma 19.
Lastly, we focus on the upper bound described by Lemma 20. According to the inequality of
arithmetic and geometric means, x(1− x) ≤ 2−2 holds for any x ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, when 2m ≤M (i.e.
n ≥ m), we can have
H(m, p) ≤ 2−2mω(p) ·
∫ p
p¯
xn−m(x− 1 + p)dx (61)
where the equality only holds when m = 0.∫ p
p¯
xn−m(x− 1 + p)dx = (2p− 1)p
δ
δ
+
∆
δ(δ + 1)
(62)
where δ = n−m+ 1 and ∆ = p¯δ+1 − pδ+1 < 0. Hence,
log
H(m, p)
H(0, p)
≤ −2m[log(2p)− ε(m)] +O
(
1
M
)
(63)
where ε(m) = −(2m)−1[log(n−m+ 1)− log(M + 1)]. Since log(x) is a concave function, we
can know that
ε(m) ≤ (M)−1 log(M + 1) = O (M−1) (64)
which concludes the first case in Lemma 20. Similarly, for 2m > M (i.e. n < m), we can have
log
H(m, p)
H(M,p)
≤ −2n[log(2p)− εˆ(n)] +O
(
1
M
)
(65)
where εˆ(n) ≤ O(M−1). Thereby, we can conclude the second case of Lemma 20. Note that the case
where p < 0.5 can be derived by using Lemma 16.
For the case that t = 0 and M  1, using the same method as the above proof, we can derive the
same lower and upper bounds as Lemmas 20 and 19. On the other hand, for t = 0, Lemma 18 does
not hold and we can have
Lemma 21. H(m, p;M, 0) = H(n, p;M, 0)
Proof. When t = 0,
H(m, p) = 2M+1(2p− 1)−1
∫ p
p¯
xn(1− x)mdx. (66)
Then, substituting x as 1− v concludes Lemma 21.
C Proof for Theorem 1
Following the notations in Section B, when M  1 in Eqn. (5), we have P˜i = EL(xi + zi)/M +
O(1/M), where EL denotes the expectation of P(L|L). Meanwhile, according to Chebyshev’s
inequality, Pi = (xi + wi)/M + , where || ≤1−δ O(1/
√
δM) and δ is any given number in (0, 1).
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Here, we use a ≤1−δ b to denote that a is smaller or equal than b with probability 1− δ. Thus, we
can calculate the upper bound of |P˜i − Pi| as
|P˜i − Pi| ≤1−δ EL|wi − zi|/M +O(1/
√
M) ≤ EL [m/M ] +O(1/
√
M). (67)
Recalling Lemma 1, we know that when M  1,
E[m/M ] . (1 + eδ)−1(ε+ eδ)(1 + ε)M−1 , E[m/M ]2 . (1 + eδ)−1(ε2 + eδ)(1 + ε)M−2. (68)
where ε−1 =
∏N
i=0(2Pˆi)2, δ = O[∆ · log(M)] and ∆ =
∑N
i=1[1(Pi < 0.5) − 1(Pi > 0.5)]. If
∆ < 0, from the definition of ∆, we can know that ∆ ≤ 1. Thus, eδ ≤ O(1/M). Furthermore, when∏N
i=0(2Pˆi)2 ≥M , ε ≤M−1. Thereby,
E
[m
M
]
. C1
M · C2 , E
[m
M
]2
. C1
M2 · C22
(69)
where C1 = (1 + M−1)M ≈ e and C2 = 1 + M−1 ≈ 1. Based on Eqn. (69), we can know
E[m/M ] . O(1/M) and Var[m/M ] . O(1/M2). Again, according to Chebyshev’s inequality, we
can have EL [m/M ] ≤1−δ O(1/
√
δM), and we can conclude Theorem 1 by taking the upper bound
of EL [m/M ] into Eqn. (67).
D Background for Reinforcement Learning
In this section, we introduce some important concepts about reinforcement learning (RL). In an RL
problem, an agent interacts with an unknown environment and attempts to maximize its cumulative
collected reward [31, 32]. The environment is commonly formalized as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) defined asM = 〈S,A,R,P, γ〉. At time t the agent is in state st ∈ S where it takes an
action at ∈ A leading to the next state st+1 ∈ S according to the transition probability kernel P ,
which encodes P(st+1 | st, at). In most RL problems, P is unknown to the agent. The agent’s goal
is to learn the optimal policy, a conditional distribution pi(a | s) that maximizes the sate’s value
function. The value function calculates the cumulative reward the agent is expected to receive given
it would follow the current policy pi after observing the current state st
V pi(s) = Epi
[ ∞∑
k=1
γkrt+k | st = s
]
.
Intuitively, it measures how preferable each state is given the current policy.
As a critical step towards improving a given policy, it is a standard practice for RL algorithms to learn
a state-action value function (i.e. Q-function). Q-function calculates the expected cumulative reward
if agent choose a in the current state and follows pi thereafter
Qpi(s, a) = Epi [R(st, at, st+1) + γV pi(st+1) | st = s, at = a] .
In real-world problems, in order to achieve better generalization, instead of learning a value for each
state-action pair, it is more common to learn an approximate value function: Qpi(s, a; θ) ≈ Qpi(s, a).
A standard approach is to learn a feature-based state representation φ(s) instead of using the raw
state s [10]. Due to the popularity of Deep Reinforcement learning, it has been a trend to deploy
neural networks to automatically extract high-level features [27, 20]. However, running most deep
RL models are very computationally heavy. On contrast, static feature representations are usually
light-weight and simple to deploy. Several studies also reveal that a carefully designed static feature
representation can achieve performance as good as the most sophisticated deep RL models, even in
the most challenging domains [14].
E Utility-Maximizing Strategy for Workers
Lemma 22. For worker i, when M  1 and at > ci,HPi,H−0.5 , if P˜ti ≈ Pti, reporting truthfully
(rptti = 1) and exerting high efforts (eft
t
i = 1) is the utility-maximizing strategy.
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Proof. When M  1, we can have∑j sci(j) ≈ M · P˜i. Thus, the utility of worker i can be
computed as
uti ≈M · at · (P˜i − 0.5) +M · b−M · ci,H · eftti. (70)
Further considering Eqn. (1) and PL = 0.5, if P˜ti ≈ Pti, we can compute worker i’s utility as
uti ≈M · [at(2 · rptti − 1)(Pi,H − 0.5)− ci,H ] · eftti +M · b. (71)
Thereby, if at >
ci,H
Pi,H−0.5 , rpt
t
i = 1 and eft
t
i = 1 maximize u
t
i, which concludes Lemma 22.
F Uninformative Equilibrium
The uninformative equilibrium denotes the case where all workers collude by always reports the
same answer to all tasks. For traditional peer prediction mechanisms, under this equilibrium, all the
workers still can get high payments because these mechanisms determines the payment by comparing
the reports of two workers. However, the data requester only can get uninformative labels, and thus
this equilibrium is undesired.
In our mechanism, when workers always reports the same answer, for example 1, our Bayesian
inference will wrongly regard the collected labels as high-quality ones and calculate the estimates as
P˜i =
M + 2
M + 3
, τ˜−1 =
M + 1
M + 2
. (72)
If the answer is 2, our estimates are
P˜i =
M + 2
M + 3
, τ˜+1 =
M + 1
M + 2
. (73)
In this case, we can build a warning signal for the uninformative equilibrium as
Sigu =
1
N
N∑
i=1
log(P˜i) + log(max{τ˜1, τ˜2}) (74)
If
Sigu ≥ log
M + 1
M + 3
(75)
workers are identified to be under the uniformative equilibrium, and we will directly set the score in
our payment rule as 0. By doing so, we can create a huge loss for workers and push them to leave
this uninformative equilibrium.
G Proof for Theorem 3
In our proof, if we omit the superscript t in an equation, we mean that this equation holds for all
time steps. Due to the one step IC, we know that, to get higher long term payments, worker i must
mislead our RIL algorithm into at least increasing the scaling factor from a to any a′ > a at a certain
state sˆ. Actually, our RIL algorithm will only increase the scaling factor when the state-action value
function satisfies Qpi(sˆ, a) ≤ Qpi(sˆ, a′). Eqn. (8) tells us that the reward function consists of the
utility obtained from the collected labels (F (A˜t)) and the utility lost in the payment (η
∑N
i=1P
t
i ).
Once we increase the scaling factor, we at least need to increase the payments for the other N − 1
workers by M
∑
x 6=i Px,H ·GA, corresponding to the left-hand side of the first equation in Eqn. (11).
On the other hand, for the obtained utility from the collected labels, we have
Lemma 23. At any time step t, if all workers except worker i report truthfully and exert high efforts,
we have F (A˜t) ≤ F (1) and F (A˜t) ≥ F (1− ψ), where ψ is defined in Eqn. (11).
Proof. In our Bayesian inference algorithm, when M  1, the estimated accuracy A˜ satisfies
A˜ ≈ 1− Eg(σ˜j) , g(σ˜j) = 1/(1 + e|σ˜j |). (76)
From the proof of Theorem 2, we can know that P˜ti ≈ Pti. In this case, according to Eqn. (??), we
can have
σ˜j(Pi) ≈ log
(
τ−1
τ+1
λ
δij1−δij2
i
∏
k 6=iλ
δkj1−δkj2
H
)
. (77)
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where λi = Pi/(1− Pi) and λH = PH/(1− PH).
We know that A˜ ≤ 1.0 holds no matter what strategy worker i takes. To prove Lemma 2, we still need
to know the lower bound of A˜. Thus, we consider two extreme cases where worker i intentionally
provides low-quality labels:
Case 1: If Pi = 0.5, we can eliminate λi from Eqn.77 because λi = 1. Furthermore, according to
Lemma 12, we can know that g(σ˜j) < eσ˜j and g(σ˜j) < e−σ˜j both hold. Thus, we build a tighter
upper bound of g(σ˜j) by dividing all the combinations of δkj1 and δkj2 in Eqn.77 into two sets and
using the smaller one of eσ˜j and e−σ˜j in each set. By using this method, if the true label is −1, we
can have E[L(j)=−1]g(σ˜j) < q1 + q2, where
q1 =
τ+1
τ−1
∑N−1
n=K+1
CnN−1(
1
λH
)n−mPnH(1− PH)m
q2 =
τ−1
τ+1
∑K
n=0
CnN−1λH
n−mPnH(1− PH)m
n =
∑
k 6=iδkj(−1) , m =
∑
k 6=iδkj(+1)
and K = b(N − 1)/2c. By using Lemma 13, we can thus get
E[L(j)=−1]g(σ˜j) < cτ [4PH(1− PH)]
N−1
2 .
where cτ = τ−1τ−1+1 + τ
−1
−1 τ+1. Similarly,
E[L(j)=+1]g(σ˜j) < cτ [4PH(1− PH)]
N−1
2 .
Thereby, A˜ > 1− cτ [4PH(1− PH)]N−12 = 1− ψ.
Case 2: If Pi = 1− PH , we can rewrite Eqn.77 as
σ˜j(1− PH) ≈ log
(
τ−1
τ+1
λx−yH
∏
k 6=iλ
δkj(−1)−δkj(+1)
H
)
where x = δij(+1) and y = δij(−1). Since Pi = 1− PH , x and y actually has the same distribution
as δkj(−1) and δkj(+1). Thus, the distribution of σ˜j(1−PH) is actually the same as σ˜j(PH). In other
words, since Theorem 2 ensures P˜i ≈ Pi, our Bayesian inference algorithm uses the information
provided by worker i via flipping the label when Pi < 0.5.
Thus, even if worker i intentionally lowers the label quality, A˜ ≥ 1− ψ still holds. Considering F (·)
is a non-decreasing monotonic function, we conclude Lemma 2.
Thereby, if Eqn. (13) is satisfied, worker i will not be able to cover Q value loss in the payments,
and our RL algorithm will reject the hypothesis to increase the scaling factor. In this case, the only
utility-maximizing strategy for worker i is to report truthfully and exert high efforts.
H Worker Models
To demonstrate the general applicability of our mechanism, we test it under three different worker
models in Section 5.2, with each capturing a different way to decide the labeling strategy. The formal
description of the three models is as follows:
• Rational workers alway act to maximize their own utilities. Since our incentive mechanism
theoretically ensures that exerting high effort is the utility-maximizing strategy for all
workers (proved in Section 4), it is safe to assume workers always do so as long as the
payment is high enough to cover the cost.
• Quantal Response (QR) workers [19] exert high efforts with the probability
eftti =
exp(λ · utiH)
exp(λ · utiH) + exp(λ · utiL)
where utiH and u
t
iL denote worker i’s expected utility after exerting high or low efforts
respectively at time t. λ describe workers’ rationality level and we set λ = 3.
22
• Multiplicative Weight Update (MWU) workers [2] update their probabilities of exerting
high efforts at every time step t after receiving the payment as the following equation
eftt+1i =
eftti(1 + u¯·H)
eftti(u¯·H − u¯·L) + u¯·L + 1
where u¯·H and u¯·L denote the average utilities received if exerting high efforts or low efforts
at time t respectively. We initialize eft0i as 0.2 in our experiments.
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